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This paper focuses on the bargaining process underlying fi-
nancial arrangements between the IMF and recipient countries. The
primary aim is to investigate the relationship between the own
country characteristics, both in terms of macroeconomic conditions
and bargaining power, and the outcome of the agreement with the
Fund. IMF lending practices respond to economic conditions but
are also sensitive to other factors that reflect the importance of the
country within the international financial community (measured
by the bilateral trade volume between the country and the OECD
countries and by debt service) and the importance of the country
within the international politics (measured by the UN voting pat-
terns between the country and the USA, the colonial past and by
country share of IMF quotas). [JEL Code: O19]
1. - Introduction
In the last twenty years we have assisted to a growing 
participation of many developing and transitional countries in the
IMF financial arrangements. Faced with recurrent imbalances of
payments induced by the oil price shocks of the 1970s, pressure
for currency devaluation, the debt crisis and the macroeconomic
instability associated with financial crisis in Latin America, Asia
and Russia, the developing nations have turned with increasing
frequency to IMF credits and stabilization plans. Eventually, the
21
* <matteo.bobba@upf.edu>. The author thanks for helpful and insightful com-
ments: Guido Tabellini, Eliana La Ferrara, Barbara Chizzolini, Lucia Dalla Pelle-
grina, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Matthias Messner, Giuseppe Cappelletti, Francesca
Spinazzola and three anonymous referees.IMF evolved from the main guardian of the macroeconomic sta-
bility of the whole economic environment to the crisis manager
and development financer for developing countries.
Among the 553 financial arrangements approved by the IMF
1
in this period, there is a wide diversity in terms of loan amount
and tightness of conditionality. The Fund’s official claims assert
that the reason of these disparities relies upon the peculiar macro-
economic situation in each recipient country. However, historical
evidence
2 on loan programs approved in developing countries with
similar structure of the economy and macroeconomic per-
formances tend to reject this conclusion and suggest a different
pattern of IMF lending based on the importance of each country
bargaining power vis-à-vis the Fund.
Despite the broad existing literature on the IMF, there are still
few explanations on why financial programs have been so different
in terms of loan amount and tightness of conditionality. Some
recent studies, as Barro and Lee (2002) and Thacker (1999), have
investigated the determination of IMF financial arrangements,
interpreting the Fund as a bureaucratic and political organization
influenced by the power of its major shareholding countries. This
paper extends these works by focusing on the bargaining process
of the financial arrangement between the IMF and one recipient
country with the intention of investigating the relationship
between the own characteristics of one recipient country, in terms
of macroeconomic condition and bargaining power, and the out-
come of the loan program approved by the IMF.
With this rationale, I develop a simple model using the tools
of axiomatic bargaining theory in order to capture each single
class of factors which influences the outcome of the agreement,
in terms of loan amount and tightness of conditionality. I then
verify empirically the principal implications of the model using a
sample of 170 IMF programs approved in the period 1992-1998
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1 IMF (2000, Appendix Table).
2 The unprecedented loan amount of 688 per cent the country quota approved
in Mexico in 1994 is one outstanding example. See also THACKER S.C. (1999), BOR-
DO G. - JAMES H. (2000) and KRUEGER A. (1998) for a detailed description of these
stylized facts.and 149 countries (the total of all developing and transitional
economies).
Using different econometric methodologies and exploring both
a cross sectional and panel dimension for the available data, the
empirical results prove the importance of three broad classes of
own country factors: macroeconomic pre-conditions, the economic
relevance and the geo political relevance.
IMF lending practices respond to economic conditions but are
also sensitive to other factors that reflect the importance of the
country within the international financial community (measured
by the bilateral trade volume between the country and the OECD
countries and debt service) and the importance of the country
within the international politics (measured by the UN voting pat-
terns between the country and the US, the colonial past and
country share of IMF quotas).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides a theoretical framework to analyze the negotiation of a
financial arrangement between the IMF and one representative
recipient country. Section 3 presents the data, some methodological
issues and the main empirical results of the regression analyses.
Concluding observations with some implications follow in Section
4. The model is fully described in the Appendix.
2. - Theoretical Framework
2.1 The Model
The IMF (F) and the government of one recipient country (G)
bargain on the main terms of a financial arrangement that will
be implemented in the case of an agreement. It is convenient to
express these terms by the couple (T, C), where T is the approved
loan amount and C = C1, C2,… ,Cn is a vector denoting the total
number of conditions attached to the loan. If an agreement is
achieved player G gets the following utility:
(1) U
G = U
G (T, C, Z)
M.A. BOBBA
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The Determinants of IMF Loan ProgramsWhere Z = Z1, Z2,… ,Zn is a vector of macroeconomic variables
which denotes the present and past performances of the country
economy. Jointly these variables represent the country determi-
nants of the demand for a Fund arrangement and, therefore,
influence the utility that the government achieves from the agree-
ment.
For expression (1) the following three conditions concerning
the marginal effects hold
3:
(2)
The first condition is trivial and assumes that the govern-
ment of the recipient country is better off the higher is the loan
amount approved. The second condition implies that for the
government, each condition attached to the loan is welfare
diminishing. This accounts for the fact that the adoption of
certain policies proposed by an international institution implies
a loss of independence and ownership for the sovereign government
which ultimately will damage its reputation and political sup-
port
4.
Finally, the third condition says that the better is the macro-
economic performance of the country, the less is the need for IMF
financial resources and, as a consequence, the less is the utility
gain for the government from the agreement.
By similar arguments, if an agreement is reached, the IMF
gains the following utility:
(3) U
F = U
F (T, C, Z)
and the following three symmetric marginal effect conditions hold:
(4)
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3 In the model all functions are assumed differentiable up to the n
th order.
4 With respect to the concept of ownership the literature is extensive. See for
example BOUGHTON J. - MOURMOURAS A. (2002).is the loan amount disbursed and the higher is the number of
conditions approved in the program. This means that IMF seeks
to approve a program which is efficient, leading to the best macro-
economic outcome through the minimum financial effort. Finally,
the third condition claims that the better are the macroeconomic
performances of the recipient country, the higher is the likelihood
that the economy will succeed in achieving the program’s target
and respectively the utility that the Fund will gain from the
agreement.
On the other hand, if the two players fail in attaining an agree-




Where  X = X1, X2,… ,Xn is a vector of bargaining variables
which reflect the own country characteristics that mirror its
economic and geopolitical importance, in terms of its connections
with the major shareholders of the Fund. For this utility pair, the
following conditions upon the marginal effects hold:
(7)
The marginal effects in (7) imply that, if an agreement
between the two players is not reached, the country can exploit
its strategic and geopolitical weight and rely on influential donor
countries for obtaining bilateral channels of financial resources
5.

















5 ALESINA A. - DOLLAR D. (2000) studied the determinants of bilateral aid from
major donors (United States, Japan, France and Germany) to receiving countries.
Despite of substantial differences among donors, the authors found considerable
evidence that the direction of foreign aid is dictated by political and strategic
considerations, much more than by the economic needs and policy performance
of the recipients. Japan’s aid is particularly related to the UN voting pattern: a
country that voted relatively often with Japan in the UN receives 177 percent more
aid. Similarly, the United States pattern of aid giving is vastly influenced by that
country’s interest in the Middle East: Egypt and Israel receives much more aid
than other countries.
The Determinants of IMF Loan Programsopportunity to get involved as a creditor with respect to a strate-
gically relevant country.
Given the equation set up and assumptions above, it is now
possible to express the negotiation dynamic of a financial arrange-




and compute the relative Nash solution, which gives a bargaining
outcome (T*, C*) that satisfies the following equilibrium condi-
tion:
(9)
This condition says that player G and F will accept an arrange-
ment such that the respective marginal rate of substitution
between the enhancement of new financial resources and the im-
position of policy conditions are equal.
It is noteworthy that the outcome of the bargaining process will
crucially depends on the marginal impact of the two exogenous
variables (Z and X) with respect to the equilibrium outcome (T
*,
C
*). Algebraic computations are shown in the appendix, in this
context, it is useful noting that the marginal impact of the macro-
economic variables Z on the equilibrium outcome depends on the
marginal impact of Z on the marginal utilities that each player
gains from the agreement, in particular:
(10)
These conditions imply that for player G the marginal benefit
of the loan and the marginal cost of conditionality are decreasing
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6 Full algebraic computations of the model including the comparative static
results are shown in the appendix.conditionality and the marginal cost of the loan are increasing
with respect to Z.
The ultimate effect of Z on the equilibrium outcome depends
on the magnitude of the marginal effects shown in (10). In
particular, if the effect of Z on the marginal benefit of the loan
for G is relatively large and the effect of Z on the marginal ben-
efit of conditionality for F is relatively small it results that the im-
pact of Z is negative both on T and on C
7.
Finally, the impact of X on the bargaining outcome simply
depends weather the marginal effects shown in (7) are positive or
negative. In particular, each own country characteristic which
raises the relative bargaining power of the country with respect
to the IMF impacts positively on T and negatively on C.
2.2 Interpretation and Predictions of the Model
Within this framework, the equilibrium outcome of the
bargaining process between the Fund and one recipient country
depends on two main relations: the interaction between the
country demand and the Fund supply of financial resources and
the availability of reciprocal alternatives in the case an agreement
is not reached. From these main relations it is possible to distin-
guish two broad classes of underlying factors which influence the
program outcome. Macroeconomic factors which induce the gov-
ernment to seek and the Fund to offer financial help and economic
and geo-political factors that connect the recipient country to the
major IMF shareholders.
With respect to the macroeconomic determinants (vector Z in
the model), this analysis extents and confirms both the Fund
official claims and the existing literature. Previous studies
8 had in
fact focused on the economic determinants of IMF lending,
evaluating all the possible factors which affect the Fund partici-
pation in a recipient country. Despite of the fact that the approach
M.A. BOBBA
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7 See Appendix A for a more detailed and formal explanation.
8 CONWAY P. (1994); KNIGHT M. - SANTAELLA J. (1997); SANTAELLA J. (1995).
The Determinants of IMF Loan Programspresented here is slightly different — it focuses on the bargaining
dynamics of a financial arrangement and its consequences in
terms of the program outcome — the relevance of typical macro-
economic factors, as GDP per capita, the growth rate of GDP, the
level of investments and the inflation rate, emerges as a robust
empirical regularity in IMF lending patterns.
The model prediction in terms of the approved program’s out-
come is that these factors are negatively correlated with both the
loan amount and the number of conditions. As long as the macro-
economic performances get better for one country, the need for
financial resources becomes less binding and the government is more
sensitive to a marginal increase in the imposition of conditional
policies in exchange of a marginal increase in the loan amount.
Alternatively, the bargaining determinants (vector X in the
model) can be interpreted as a sort of own country endowment
which raises its weight and relevance with respect to the
international financial and political community. It is worth to split
this class of factors into the two more specific dimensions of
economic and geo-political factors. The formers are own country
characteristics that reflect its importance in the economic system
as a whole and in particular its economic connections with IMF
major shareholders, as the extent of bilateral trade with OECD
countries, the outstanding level of external debt and its service,
the amount of FDI, the endowment of strategic natural resources
and the amount of bilateral foreign aid. All these factors raise the
economic bargaining power of the country with respect to the
most powerful IMF member countries. For example, debt service
constitutes a heavy burden on country economic development: the
higher negative interests on external debt, the less the probability
of total or partial repayment for the country in arrears. In this
situation, the threat of western banks seizure of the tradable goods
exported from the country becomes more binding and IMF will
intervene in debt renegotiation to preserve the economic interests
of import countries
9. Counter intuitively, countries in arrears
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9 The literature on debt renegotiation is extensive. See BULOW J. - ROGOFF K.
(1986); BULOW J. - ROGOFF K. (1990); WELLS R. (1993) for enlightening discussions
on this topic.increase their bargaining power with respect to the IMF and debt
service becomes a “double-edged weapon” for western countries.
The geo-political factors reflect the country importance in the
international politics and in particular its political relations with IMF
major shareholders, as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
voting patterns between the country and the US, the colonial and
political past and the country share of IMF quotas. These factors
influence the country relevance in the international political system
and consequently in the IMF executive board. For example if a
country was a colony during the 20th century, it can exploit its
privileged diplomatic relations to obtain bilateral financial aid
10. This
valuable outside option raises the former colony’s bargaining power
in the negotiation of a financial arrangement with the IMF.
The model predicts that these factors raise the bargaining
power of the country with respect to the IMF and induce a better
program outcome for the country, in terms of higher loan amount
approved and less binding imposition of conditional policies, apart
from its macroeconomic performances.
All these a priori predictions upon the main directions of
correlation between the own country factors and the approved
program outcome need an empirical counterpart which can
investigate the validation and the real fit of the model.
3. - Empirical Evidence
3.1 Data Description and Methodology
I have data on IMF arrangements from the database MONA
(Monitoring of IMF Arrangements), compiled by the Fund’s staff
from 1992 and containing all financial programs approved from
the beginning of that year
11. The analysis is restricted to the period
M.A. BOBBA
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10 See the determinants of the pattern of allocation of foreign aid in ALESINA
A. - DOLLAR D. (2000).
11 The database is nevertheless missing 18 programs approved in 1992. These
data are available to the author thanks to the kind concession of Anna Ivanova
(IMF research staff).
The Determinants of IMF Loan Programs1992-1998, in which 170 programs have been approved with
respect to 85 developing and transitional countries. In order to
avoid the sample selection bias in the estimation results, I have
included the remaining 64 developing and transitional countries
which did not participate in a Fund supported program during
the time period under consideration; this control group should not
differ systematically in the own country characteristics from the
program group
12.
I measure the program outcome using the loan amount
approved in USD millions as a fraction of the country’s GDP
13 and
the number of structural conditions attached to the loan. This
latter variable seeks to catch the tightness of the imposition of
conditional policies and the resulting loss of ownership in the
government policies due to IMF intervention
14.
All the macroeconomic time series and the bargaining economic
variables for the period 1992-1998 are accessible from the WDI and
IFS databases. Data on historical records of UNGA voting
alignments between the US and each UN member country are
available on the web site of the US Department of State. I express
the political connections between the US and sample countries in
two ways. The first is the yearly average fraction of votes in which
one country voted along the US and measures the static political
proximity, the second is the first difference of this variable and picks
up the dynamics of the political movement toward or away from
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2004
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12 A full list of the 149 countries (program and control) is shown in Appendix
B.
13 Other normalizations of the loan amount might be reasonable, as for
example the balance of payment. Given the existing empirical literature, see for
example BARRO R. - LEE J.W. (2002), I have adopted GDP for controlling for the
economic size of the country.
14 In order to measure quantitatively the degree of imposition of the
conditional policies one would need to evaluate the potential spread between the
policies that the government commits to implement after the loan negotiation and
the policies that the government would have anyway implemented without IMF
intervention. Because of the lack of availability of specific data on each IMF
program and relative condition imposed, I have opted for an alternative
methodology that consists in considering which type of condition affects more the
government ownership in the policies. Given the existing literature on policy
ownership, see for example BOUGHTON J. - MOURMOURAS A. (2002), structural
conditions seem the natural candidate.the US position. The remaining geo-political variables — i.e. colonial
and political past dummies — have been constructed by the author
15.
I have panel data for 149 countries and 7 years which results
in a total of 1043 observations for the explanatory variables
representing the own country factors and only 170 observations
for the dependent variables representing the program outcome. To
overcome this missing observation problem, I have considered two
alternative strategies. The first consists of compressing the time
series dimension of the panel data by computing 1992-1998 period
averages for both the explanatory and dependent variables, this
operation leads to a conventional cross-section dataset. The second
strategy aims to exploit the informative value of the time varia-
tion of the explanatory variables by smoothing the values of loan
amount and number of structural conditions into the expected
number of program years.
This last approach seems to fit better with the available data
because it allows catching the unobservable heterogeneity of each
country left unexplained by the regressors by the use of an effects
model. Although, given the censored nature of both dependent
variables, this modelling framework is fraught with difficulties and
unconventional estimation problems
16. Estimation of the random
effects model requires no correlation between the country
heterogeneity and the explanatory variables, which is a very strong
assumption in this setting given the endogenous nature of most
regressors; the fixed effects model encounters an incidental para-
meters problem that renders the maximum likelihood estimator
inconsistent
17.
For these reasons, it is useful to evaluate the estimation results
of both strategies and compare them in order to verify their ro-
bustness and validation.
In considering the cross section setting, using the average size
M.A. BOBBA
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15 A full list of variables used in the analyses with some descriptive statistics
is shown in Appendix C.
16 See GREENE W.H. (2003), chapter 21.
17 The only efficient way to estimate a fixed effects Tobit model is to adopt
the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) by using the dynamic model condition
proposed by HONORÈ E. (1992). The resulting estimates are semi-parametric, in
the sense that no particular assumptions relative to the error terms are required. 
The Determinants of IMF Loan Programsof IMF loans as a fraction of country’s GDP and the average
number of structural conditions approved as dependent variables,
I specify the following Tobit model to take to account of the
censoring of both the dependent variables at zero:
(11) Yi
* = α + β Zi + γ Xi + δΩ i + ε i, i =1 ,… ,1 4 9
(12) Yi = Yi
* if Yi
* >0
(13) Yi =0 i f Yi
* ≤ 0
where the dependent variable, Yi, indicates alternatively the average
loan amount and number of structural conditions approved for
country  i during the period 1992-1998, Yi =0   corresponds to
countries for which no program has been approved in the period,
while for all program countries a positive value is observed. Vector
Zi denotes the relevant own country macroeconomic variables that
influence the country and the Fund marginal utility of the
agreement and includes the period averages of GDP
18, GDP per
capita, the level of investments and the amount of multilateral
financial resources apart IMF ones. Vector Xi denotes the bargaining
economic variables that affect the economic relevance of the
country with respect to IMF major shareholders and includes the
period average of the intensity of trade with the OECD countries
and the debt service. Finally, vector Ω i denotes the bargaining geo-
political variables that influence the political and strategic
importance of the country with respect to IMF major shareholders
and includes the period averages of the UN voting alignment with
the US, UN voting movement toward the US, the colonial past
dummy and the share of IMF quotas. The variable ε i is a random
error term. To minimize reverse-causality problems, all explanatory
variables are measured as lagged averages computed in the period
1991-1997.
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18 This variable has been included to control for the country economic size
and to be sure that the IMF quota variable is not just a proxy for the scale of an
economy, see BARRO R. - LEE J.W. (2002).For the panel data set analysis, two alternative econometric
methodologies are appropriate. The first approach, named “fixed
effects”, assumes that the unobservable differences between
countries can be captured in differences in the constant and time-
invariant term, which is treated as an unknown parameter to be
estimated. The fixed effects Tobit model relative to the panel data




it = α idit + β Zi, t–1 + γ Xi, t–1 + δΩ i, t–1 + ε it
i =1 ,… ,149, t = 1992, …, 1998





(16) Yit =0 i f Yit ≤ 0
Where dit is a dummy variable which assumes the value of
one for country i and zero otherwise and all the other symbols
correspond to the previous and already explained variables. Be-
cause of the potential endogenous nature of the regressors, all
the explanatory variables enter as their one period lagged value.
This estimation methodology allows the unobservable own
country factors to be correlated with the error term, on the other
hand, apart from the incidental parameter problem mentioned
above, the main drawback of this setting is that it does not permit
to specify the observable and time-invariant variables, as country
share of quotas and the colonial past dummy.
The second approach, named “random effects”, models the
unobservable differences between countries as randomly distrib-
uted within the whole sample. In other words, these unobservable
factors are treated as parametric shifts of the regression function
and the underlying model can be viewed as a traditional regres-
sion model with a random constant term. The random effects
model relative to the panel data set under consideration can be
expressed by the following equations:
M.A. BOBBA
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*
it = β Zit–1 + γ Xi, t–1 + δΩ i, t–1 + ε it + ui
i =1 ,… ,149, t = 1992, …, 1998





(19) Yit =0 i f Y
*
it ≤ 0
Where  ui is an independently distributed random variable
which reflects the heterogeneity component relative to each country. 
This approach allows including among the explanatory vari-
ables also the time-invariant observable factors, which seem cru-
cial in the context of this analysis. The major model drawback is
instead the hypothesis of orthogonality between the random term
ui and the explanatory variables.
3.2 Estimation Results. The Determinants of IMF Programs 
Outcome
I have tried various functional forms for the Tobit speci-
fied above and selected the one which delivered the best good-
ness-of-fit. It turns out that GDP, UN voting alignment, UN
voting movement and the share of IMF quotas enter as their
log values.
Table 1 below presents the maximum likelihood estimation
results for model (11)-(13). Dependent variables are the period
averages of loan amount as a fraction of country’s GDP (Loan
amount) and of the number of structural conditions (Structural
conditions) approved for each country.
In considering the macroeconomic variables, most of the
estimated coefficients are significant and all of them appear neg-
atively correlated with both loan-GDP ratio and conditionality.
This result confirms the model predictions with respect to the
interaction between the demand and supply of financial resources.
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cipient country government is more willing to accept the IMF pro-
gram terms and the Fund reluctance to disburse financial re-
sources is compensated by tighter imposition of conditional poli-
cies.
Both the estimated coefficients of the bargaining economic
variables result statistically significant, positively correlated with
the loan amount and negatively correlated with the number of
structural condition. A one standard deviation increase in the
intensity of bilateral trade with OECD countries is estimated to
M.A. BOBBA
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The Determinants of IMF Loan Programs
TABLE 1
DETERMINANTS OF IMF PROGRAMS OUTCOME
(CROSS SECTION ANALYSES)
Variable Loan amount Structural conditions








** –2.10 –0.079 –1.12
Other multilateral aid –0.002 –1.19 –0.033 –1.29




Debt service 0.017** 2.03 –0.039
* –1.71
Log (UN voting  0.059 –0.46 –3.482 –0.70
alignment with US)
Log (UN voting  0.175
*** 3.06 –1.219 –0.09
movement toward US)
Colonial past dummy –0.474
*** –4.78 –6.786
*** –4.34







R square 0.439 0.091
N° obs 99 109
* 10 per cent confidence level
** 5 per cent confidence level
*** 1 per cent confidence levelraise the ratio of loan to GDP by 5.8 per cent and to decrease the
number of structural conditions by 3.47 per cent. A one standard
deviation increase in the debt service is estimated to increase the
ratio of loan to GDP by 6.9 per cent and to decrease the number
of structural condition by 0.15 per cent. These results confirm the
importance of the bargaining economic power of recipient coun-
tries in IMF lending decision: the more the country’s economy is
connected with the international financial and economic commu-
nity, the better is the negotiation outcome of the IMF program.
Among the geo-political variables, a one standard deviation
increase in the movement toward the US position, measured by
the UNGA voting patterns, induces an increase of the ratio of loan
to GDP by 11.8 per cent; the impact of this variable on the num-
ber of structural conditions, though negative (as expected), is not
significant. A 1.58 increase in the share of IMF quotas (the vari-
able standard deviation) is estimated to raise the ratio of loan to
GDP by 45 per cent. The coefficient of colonial past dummy is
estimated to decrease both the ratio of loan to GDP and the num-
ber of structural conditions. Although this last result is not com-
pletely in accordance with the model’s prediction, the overall
estimated coefficients of this group of variables seem to prove the
relevance of high politics in IMF lending practices.
Table 2 below presents the maximum likelihood estimation
results for the Tobit fixed and random effects model expressed in
(14)-(16) and (17)-(19). Given the estimation difficulties associated
with this framework, I show and comment jointly the results of
these alternative methodologies and compare them with the cross
section empirical regularities exposed in Table 1.
The main difference between the two alternative specifications
of the unobservable country heterogeneity is the exclusion in the
fixed effects model of the time-invariant geo-political variables, in
order to avoid collinearity problems with respect to the country
dummies.
Despite some variations with regards to the cross section
analysis, a number of empirical regularities confirm the robust-
ness of the main estimation results.
First, macroeconomic variables are again jointly significant
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2004
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land present the expected signs in explaining the relation between
the macroeconomic performance of recipient countries and the
approved outcome of IMF program.
Furthermore, among the economic bargaining variables, only
the debt service resists the robustness check; presenting a signifi-
cant and positive estimated coefficient for the ratio of loan to GDP
and a negative estimated coefficient for the number of structural
conditions. The estimated coefficient relative to the intensity of trade
variable appears significant with the expected negative sign in
explaining the number of conditions only in the fixed effects model.
Finally, the estimated coefficients of the geo-political variables
result jointly significant in explaining the outcome of IMF pro-
grams and with the expected signs. Movement toward US position
in UNGA decisions, being a colony in the 20th century and hav-
ing a higher share of IMF quotas imply a favoured treatment in
IMF programs, in terms of higher ratio of loan to GDP and low-
er number of structural conditions approved.
3.3 Empirical Results. The Determinants of IMF Participation
As I mentioned earlier, the few previous studies
19 which have
investigated the extra-economic determinants of IMF financial
arrangements, have focused on the Fund’s participation. In this
paragraph, I extend the previous result on the importance of the
bargaining variables in IMF lending decision by testing statisti-
cally the relations between the country bargaining power (mea-
sured by the same variables that appear robust in the previous
analysis) and IMF participation.
I specify two alternative regression models, which respectively
employ as dependent variable the expected IMF program duration
(in years) and the probability of a program approval and as ex-
planatory variables the same three groups of country characteris-
tics which appear in the rest of this paper. The first dependent
variable has the same characteristics of the previous ones — it is
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19 BARRO R. - LEE J.W. (2002); THACKER S.C. (1999).censored at zero —, therefore a Tobit model is again suitable. The
second variable is instead binary and needs a Probit model. The
major shortcoming of this setting is that it is not possible to
smooth the values of the dependent variables in the program’s
year; indeed only the cross section estimation strategy is appro-
priate to overcome the missing values problem.
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TABLE 3
THE DETERMINANTS OF IMF PARTICIPATION
Variable Prob (Program) Expected duration




** –1.96 –0.370 –1.095
** –2.60
GDP per capita –0.315
** –2.49 –0.098 –0.340
*** –2.72
Inflation rate –0.003
** –2.22 –0.001 –0.010 –0.53
Other –0.008
* –1.69 –0.002 –0.010 –1.50
multilateral aid
Trade with  –0.536




* 1.66 0.022 0.069
* 1.69
Log (UN voting 1.045
* 1.68 0.325 0.613 1.07
alignment with
US)
Log (UN voting 0.394




Colonial past  –1.284
** –2.44 –0.399 –0.579 –1.38
dummy






R quadro 0.279 0.09
N° obs 99 99
* 10 per cent confidence level
** 5 per cent confidence level
*** 1 per cent confidence level
Standard errors not shown and corrected for etheroschedasticity.Table 3 presents the maximum likelihood estimation results
for the Tobit and Probit models. Dependent variables are the
period average of the expected program duration (expected
duration) and a dummy variable (program) which takes the
value of one if at least one IMF has been approved for a country
during period 1992-1998 and zero otherwise. Given the non-
linear nature of the Probit model, for a more direct
interpretation of the estimated coefficient, I calculate the
relative marginal effects computed at the sample averages of the
explanatory variables.
The only difference in these specifications with respect to
tables 1 and 2 is that I employ the inflation rate and the level of
investments as alternative macroeconomic variables. 
The estimated coefficients confirm the main intuition on the
importance of recipient countries bargaining power in IMF lend-
ing practices. The same direction of correlation found earlier on
programs outcome, appear statistically significant and with the
expected signs with regards to IMF participation.
The same bargaining factors that cause a favoured treatment
for recipient countries by the IMF, in terms of loan and conditions
approved in a program, induce a higher probability of program
approval and a longer IMF participation in it.
4. - Concluding Remarks
The IMF represents the major international financial institu-
tion within the world economic system and is currently particu-
larly involved with respect to the developing nations. Given the
existing historical disparities in the main terms of approved
financial program, the main goal of this paper was analyzing the
relationships between the own recipient country characteristics
and the outcome of an IMF financial arrangement.
In the theoretical framework I modelled the negotiation
dynamic between the Fund and one recipient country as a Nash
bargaining game. The principal model predictions guided the
specifications of the following regression analysis which aimed to
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40find empirical evidence on the relevance of recipient countries
bargaining power in IMF lending decisions.
The main empirical results, which broadly confirm the model
implications, prove the statistical significance and the robustness
of the relation between variables employed as proxies for a country
bargaining power and the outcome of an IMF program
negotiation. More strategically influent countries receives a
favoured treatment in IMF loan programs, in terms of higher loan
amount, lower number of structural conditions, higher probability
of program approval and longer program duration. In particular,
bargaining economic variables which reflect the connections
between the country’s economy and IMF major shareholders
economies (measured by the intensity of trade with OECD
countries and the debt service) and bargaining geo-political
variables relative to the international policies alliances among
recipient country and IMF major shareholders (measured by UN
voting patterns, colonial past and country share of IMF quotas)
appear significant and robust determinants of an IMF program
outcome and of IMF participation.
These findings lead two broad implications. First, recent
failures of IMF programs in achieving the expected macroeco-
nomic results could mirror the Fund willingness to help allied
countries instead of countries in effective economic difficulties.
Second, the IMF appears as a bureaucratic and political organi-
zation in which the more powerful member states are able to dri-
ve lending policies as effective instruments of national foreign poli-
cies. In this context, The United States and other powerful
industrialized nations constrain much of the behaviour of one of
the most important multilateral organization of the post-hege-
monic global economy.
This last implication underscores the practical limits of mul-
tilateralism and confirms the essential need for reforming the
Fund current quota allocation within member countries and the
subsequent voting power of each shareholder.
From a theoretical viewpoint, this paper provides many hints
for future studies. It is worth noting that there could be many
other sources of bargaining power beyond the ones explored in
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The Determinants of IMF Loan Programsthis analysis. In particular, considering and testing other country
economic and geopolitical characteristics, such as the extent of
foreign direct investment and the export of strategic natural
resources, the political history of the country and the relative ge-
ographical and political distance with former socialist or com-
munist countries may increase the understanding of the determi-
nants of IMF lending.
Finally, this paper represents the first stage of a more com-
prehensive research project that aims to assess the impact of IMF
programs on the macroeconomic performances of recipient
countries. In this view, the estimated bargaining variables can be
interpreted as instrumental variables to assess the effects of IMF
lending on a country economic performances. Using economic and
geo-political variables as proxies of IMF participation one can
overcome the econometric problem of the endogenous nature of
Fund participation in evaluating weather IMF programs were
associated with better or worse economic outcomes than would
otherwise have occurred.
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Algebraic Computations of the Model
1. The Nash Bargaining Model
Nash problem is defined by the following optimization pro-
blem:







defined over a compact and convex set S which represents all the
possible agreement utilities, is strictly quasi-concave in T and C.
More formally, the following conditions must hold:
It is now possible to compute the following first order con-
ditions (FOC), which, under the above assumptions, are necessary












































































































20 Under these assumptions, the Hessian matrix of F is semi-negative, this con-
dition is necessary and sufficient for the existence of one and only one maximum
point.
The Determinants of IMF Loan ProgramsSolving the equation system above, we obtain the equilibrium
condition (9), shown and explained in section two:
2. Comparative Static
It is crucial to assume another property for function F, which
is the super-modularity with respect to T and  C. Under this
hypotheses, the Nash solution (T
*, C
*) will be monotonic increasing
or decreasing with respect to the parameter Z and X, depending
on the signs of the relative cross-derivative with respect to the FOC
computed above
21. In order to determine these signs, we first
calculate the cross-derivatives of the FOC with respect to Z:
Given conditions (10) relative to the marginal effects of Z on
the agreement marginal utilities for the players, conditions (2) and
(4) relative to the signs of these marginal utilities and assump-
tions on the magnitude of these marginal effects explained in sec-
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21 VIVES X. (1999).By similar arguments, the cross-derivatives of the FOC with
respect to X are:
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Countries Used in the Analyses


































































































































































* Program country.APPENDIX C
List of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
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Variable N° of Mean Standard Min Max Source
obser- deviation
vations
Loan amount 149 0,539 0,935 0,000 4,888 MONA
Structural 149 3,460 6,120 0,000 42,40 MONA
conditions
program 149 0,570 0,497 0,000 1,000 MONA
Expected 149 1,389 1,294 0,000 4,000 MONA
duration
Log(GDP) 143 8,624 1,946 3,861 13,24 WDI
GDP per capita 141 2,258 3,063 0,100 18,55 WDI
Investments 144 23,23 8,498 6,906 57,531 WDI
Inflation rate 131 106,0 356,89 0,579 3385,2 IFS
Other 133 10,95 24,939 –36,753 196,95 WDI
multilateral aid
Trade with  134 –5,404 -4,031 –13,300 –1,645 Easterly
OECD countries
Debt service 145 5,414 3,612 0,504 21,229 WDI




Log(UN voting  137 –2,867 0,685 –5,204 –0,901 USA
movement depart-
toward US) ment of
State
Colonial past 146 0,596 0,492 0,000 1,000 Banks 
dummy et al.
(2000)
Log(share of 148 5,135 1,577 1,841 8,852 IMF
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